Invisible Equality: How Moldovan Television Channels Create the Illusion of Balanced Election Coverage

Television remains the battlefield for votes in the Republic of Moldova, where formal compliance with electoral laws masks systematic distortions in media access. According to the Independent Journalism Centre’s 2025 study, television stations rank second among information sources after social networks and enjoy the highest public trust amongst all media.

The Electoral Code guarantees each candidate five minutes of free airtime during the first 15 days of campaigning, whilst the Audiovisual Council, established in 1996 as an autonomous public authority, monitors compliance with principles of equal access and pluralism. However, analysis of monitoring data from 5-11 September 2025 reveals a system where visible equality conceals fundamental disparities in audience access.

Election Temperature Control: How channels define the importance of electoral discourse

The first contradiction emerges in channels’ editorial strategies for determining electoral coverage priorities. Moldova 1, the public broadcaster operated by Teleradio-Moldova, devoted 24.5% of its main “Mesager 21:00” bulletin to elections—26 stories totalling 52 minutes. This represents a measured “temperature” reflecting the public broadcaster’s position on balancing electoral agenda with other socially significant themes.

TV8, managed by the journalists’ public association “Media Alternativa”, demonstrates a more aggressive approach: 34.6% of news coverage devoted to elections—29 stories spanning 73 minutes. The channel, positioning itself as independent, makes electoral campaigns the centrepiece of its information policy.

The record belongs to Exclusiv TV: 46% of all news concerned elections. The private channel, also known as TVC21, transformed news bulletins into nearly monothematic electoral coverage—28 stories totalling 75 minutes. At the opposite pole stands R Live TV, which completely avoided electoral coverage in news programmes, concentrating exclusively on analytical formats. This editorial decision fundamentally alters how electoral information is presented: instead of immediate news updates, audiences receive analytical content. Such disparities in “election temperature” create unequal conditions for perceiving electoral campaigns, with Moldova 1 viewers seeing elections as one agenda item whilst Exclusiv TV audiences experience them as dominant political reality.

Screen Favourites: The mathematics of invisible discrimination

The second level of invisible inequality manifests in airtime distribution amongst participants. Formally, the principle appears upheld: monitoring recorded the presence of all registered competitors on major channels. Yet the mathematics of coverage tells a different story. Moldova 1 became the first channel presenting all 23 electoral competitors—an undoubted achievement in ensuring informational pluralism. However, detailed analysis reveals that PAS and the European Alternative Bloc received more screen time through a simple mechanism: more media-active political forces generate more news events, which channels must cover as legitimate stories.

TV8 formally showed all participants but with pronounced focus on the European Alternative Bloc and the Democratic Party (PDA). The channel’s editorial policy creates a “selection effect”: certain political forces receive not only more time but more favourable contexts. Exclusiv TV concentrated on the “Equal for All” Bloc (BEP) and PAS, effectively reducing other participants to electoral extras. Small parties appear in CA reports but remain invisible to channel audiences.

The inequality mathematics operates through news priority systems. With 54% of respondents watching television the day before interviews, indicating significant daily consumption levels, mention frequency becomes a political significance indicator for voters relying on television information. This creates a vicious cycle: political forces with greater resources generate more news events, receive more airtime, increasing recognition and consequently their ability to attract additional resources.

Neutrality and System Failures: When formal compliance masks editorial bias

The third contradiction lies in maintaining editorial neutrality mechanisms. Formal indicators appear encouraging: most conflict-related stories adhered to journalistic ethics principles. Moldova 1 produced only one unbalanced story amongst 11 conflict materials. TV8 demonstrated impeccable statistics: all 18 conflict stories were balanced. Exclusiv TV also presented exemplary figures: 8 conflict materials, all maintaining opinion balance.

However, technical implementation reveals critical flaws. Moldova 1 violated procedures by failing to notify CA about a special programme edition. The “Verificat” information programme used incorrect rubrics—technical errors undermining monitoring transparency systems. R Live TV demonstrated more serious systemic failures, with direct agitational appeals broadcast—flagrant neutrality principle violations. The channel systematically made marking errors, using “Electorala 2025” instead of the required “Informare” rubric.

Exclusiv TV recorded an incident with the Workers’ Action Party (PAM): agitational phrases exceeded established rules during free airtime. These violations demonstrate how formal control systems can fail at moments critically important for equal access. Technical errors aren’t merely administrative oversights—they destroy the transparency architecture upon which monitoring system trust depends. The Audiovisual Council, according to Media Services Code №174/2018, must ensure correct information principles. When systems fail, they undermine the entire control process legitimacy.

Advertising and Financial Architecture: How market logic subverts electoral equality

The fourth invisible inequality level manifests in commercial broadcasting segments, where equality principles clash with market payment capacity logic. CA monitoring data reveals striking advertising dominance patterns. TV8 broadcast 28 advertising spots totalling 14 minutes—all exclusively for PAS. The channel effectively transformed into a monothematic advertising platform for one political force.

Exclusiv TV demonstrates similar tendencies: of 29 advertising spots, 27 belonged to PAS—mathematically, 93% of commercial political airtime controlled by a single party. Moldova 1 shows more diversified patterns: 67 spots lasting 44 minutes distributed amongst PAS, the National Party, European Alternative Bloc, BEP, and “Together” Bloc. Yet PAS remains the leader in purchased airtime volume.

According to OSCE reports on 2021 parliamentary elections, the four largest parties spent 64.8% of expenditures on advertising, with 63% of advertising budgets directed toward television. This statistic demonstrates television advertising’s critical importance in Moldova’s electoral system. Advertising costs create structural advantages: whilst guaranteed five free minutes exist for each candidate, real audience attention battles occur in commercial segments governed by market laws rather than equality principles. Advertising budget concentration amongst one or two political forces transforms television space into unequal competition arenas, where free five-minute allocations become symbolic gestures against hours of paid content.

Regulatory Selective Justice: The architecture of politically motivated oversight

The Audiovisual Council’s enforcement patterns reveal systematic political selectivity behind formal procedural compliance. In 2024-2025, CA imposed significant financial penalties, but sanction geography exposes political bias. Recent enforcement actions are illustrative: several major private channels received substantial fines for regulatory violations, whilst state and aligned channels escaped sanctions for ostensible compliance.

CA Chairman Liliana Vițu publicly advocated for “media ownership transparency” and “genuine pluralism,” yet regulatory decisions follow different logic. Vice-Chairman Aneta Gonța declared all Russian content propaganda, including “films, TV series, and music”—exceeding electoral regulation boundaries. The most revealing case involves TV8: the channel received 10,000 lei fines in May 2025 for programmes where moderators “ridiculed NTV Moldova producer posts using discriminatory language” and showed “underage children’s photographs of journalists.”

International observers documented systematic enforcement inconsistencies. Freedom House downgraded Moldova to “Partly Free” (60/100 points in 2025, down from 61/100 in 2024), noting “media bias” and “dangerous precedents” in CA decisions. Reporters Without Borders warned of the regulator’s “heavy-handed approach” closing channels without judicial consultation. Since 2022, multiple television channels have been suspended, including those linked to Ilan Shor and Vladimir Plahotniuc, creating new media control architectures under “disinformation prevention” justifications.

Digital Blind Spot: Ignoring the real battleground of public opinion

CA’s most critical oversight involves ignoring digital spaces where public opinion actually forms. Research data shows internet has become a primary information source for a majority of the population, yet CA monitors only traditional media. Millions of citizens are active on social media platforms where regulation remains minimal.

The Media Ownership Monitor reveals striking contradictions: whilst CA meticulously tracks television minutes, political actors freely operate across Facebook, Telegram, and TikTok without oversight. International studies show declining trust in Russian/Russian-language sources in recent years, yet this isn’t reflected in CA methodology, which continues applying universal criteria without geopolitical context consideration.

Digital broadcasting transition created technical infrastructure for precise monitoring through modern digital standards with extensive territorial coverage, but CA doesn’t utilise these capabilities for automated analysis. Meanwhile, a majority of households use cable and IPTV services through major telecommunications operators, creating technical possibilities for detailed preference analysis that remain unexploited.

This digital blindness renders CA monitoring increasingly irrelevant as audiences migrate online, where electoral influence operates through entirely different mechanisms—targeted advertising, viral content, influencer partnerships, and algorithm manipulation—all beyond regulatory reach. The system monitors yesterday’s media whilst tomorrow’s elections are decided in unregulated digital spaces.

Democracy with a Preordained Ending

The research reveals a sophisticated system creating media pluralism illusions whilst maintaining administrative control over information spaces. The Audiovisual Council employs formally legal procedures, yet sanction selectivity, criteria opacity, and digital space ignorance create structural advantages for pro-government channels.

The system’s key mechanisms include financial dependence through state funding or external grants, selective sanction application with formal procedural compliance, alternative channel blocking under disinformation combat pretexts, and digital space neglect where public opinion actually forms. International support for combating Russian propaganda becomes a tool for suppressing any opposition, creating “invisible inequality”—situations where formal procedures are observed and international standards declared, yet outcomes remain predetermined by systemic architecture.

OSCE observers and Freedom House assessments confirm this managed pluralism: electoral diversity is permitted within strictly controlled frameworks. Moldova’s 2025 elections occur under controlled media pluralism conditions, where opinion diversity is tolerated only within predetermined boundaries. This represents a sophisticated evolution of authoritarian media control—maintaining democratic appearances whilst ensuring predictable outcomes through structural design rather than crude censorship.